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cross-posted from: https://feddit.org/post/4157628
cross-posted from: https://feddit.org/post/4157529
James Robinson, along with Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson, has been awarded this year’s Nobel Prize in Economics for his research on the critical role institutions play in fostering national prosperity. In [this Q&A session]l with EL PAÍS, he explains that his work also seeks to highlight how the legacy of colonialism has impeded economic development in certain regions, particularly in Latin America and Africa.
James Robinson: […] we make a simple division, focusing on the presence of inclusive institutions or extractive institutions. Inclusive institutions create broad incentives and opportunities for all people equally, while extractive institutions concentrate benefits and incentives in the hands of a few. Many economists say that development comes from entrepreneurship and innovation, but in reality it comes from people’s dreams, creativity and aspirations. To be prosperous, you have to create a series of institutions that can cultivate this talent. However, if you look at countries like Colombia or Nigeria, talent is wasted because people do not have opportunities.
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Institutions can be an obstacle to competitiveness. However, one should consider the impact that European integration had on countries such as Spain, Portugal or the former Soviet countries. These are remarkable success stories. There has been an almost unprecedented transition. It is true that there may be too much regulation or inefficient rules, but broadly speaking the effects of European institutions has been largely positive over the past 50 years.
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[Immigration] is one of the big questions we have to solve. […] it can be difficult. It is not easy to quickly incorporate the millions of people who cross the Mediterranean [trying to reach Europe]. One of the possible ways is to help them develop in order to improve the terrible situation in their own countries. However, one of the biggest complications is that the policies recommended by Western institutions are not in tune with what is happening in these [developing] countries. At the World Bank, for example, you cannot talk about politics. How do we expect them to solve real problems when you cannot talk about them? Frankly, it doesn’t make sense. If we really want to change the world, we have to have honest conversations. I see that as a long way off.
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The reality is that democratic countries have shown that they are better at managing public services and achieving rapid growth. You can find impressive examples like China among autocratic countries, but you cannot achieve an inclusive economy with an authoritarian regime and a model like the Chinese one.
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I don’t think the Chinese model can continue. If you look at other authoritarian regimes, like Iran or Russia, they are incredibly weak economically and technologically. The economy cannot flourish in an authoritarian regime. Right now, technological dynamism is concentrated in one such country and in the Western world. However, one has to consider that, with Donald Trump, the institutions that have made the United States great are being seriously questioned. This could affect the context, and that is why the European Union and NATO are so important.
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[Populism is linked to the growing disconnect between governments and citizens] and an example of this is Latin America. Democracy promised too much and did not always deliver. People’s lives did not change, and they sought new alternatives. There are various factors why democracy has not achieved transformations, such as clientelism and corruption. […] Venezuela was governed in a deeply corrupt manner, and Hugo Chávez was clever in taking advantage of it. You also see this with Donald Trump, who has gone far because he realized there was widespread dissatisfaction with traditional politics. The failures of democratic institutions are real, and that is why we have to think about how to make them more empathetic to what people need.
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Artificial intelligence can be wonderful, but like all technologies, it depends on how it is used. If artificial intelligence is used to create replacements for humans, that could be devastating. […] It is all about how it is used, and that depends on our governments. I think that these decisions should not be left to the tech gurus. They only think about what makes them the most money, even if this is not related to the general well-being of society. In the case of artificial intelligence, it is very important, because it could have a tectonic impact on the world.
The more advantages an army has, the more likely it is that it will prevail in any given task. Nominally, the Russian military had numerous and massive advantages over Ukraine, even with the limited NATO support offered to Ukraine 2014-2022. Yet it failed, and failed miserably. Why? Because it was hollowed out of competence, a shell of corruption and apathy polished to a shine with a large military budget.
An authoritarian regime does not immediately destroy whatever military it inherits. But like I said - it’s a process. They, by their very nature, hollow their militaries out. The point isn’t even that authoritarian militaries can’t succeed in a given task; the point is that authoritarian regimes pretty inherently weaken their own military capacity compared to non-authoritarian regimes, and no amount of spending changes that fundamental fact. Saddam is another great example of this.
Vietnam and Afghanistan may like to have a word with your first argument. I understand your second point, but i don’t see supporting arguments backing the clear trend of authoritarian governments eroding their military forces by their very nature you are so convinced about.
A bad economy will definitely weaken military strength in the long run,just like the diplomatic and trade sanctions that often are imposed on authoritarian or anti US/West regimes will. However, do you really think if we isolated these effects, the war efforts of an authoritarian government with full control over its population and production is inherently worse off than a functional democracy with broad civil rights? You may argue that this effect isolation is a hypothetical fiction, but then we’d just be talking about economies vs economies… which wasn’t my point.
Look, friend, I’m in no way saying “therefore China wins the arms race”. I’m saying authoritarianism, in the short term, by its nature has the possibility of assigning and coordinating way more resources to war efforts than a democracy. Given 2 identical counties neighboring each other, on any given day, put a totalitarian regime on one, and a democratic government on another… Which do you think has the advantage?
I hope you understand I’m presenting my position and arguments from a place of good faith and respect.
No, no, I’m willing to accept this hypothetical - but in this hypothetical, the authoritarian regime is still weaker in the long run, for the reasons I laid out. Authoritarian regimes are inherently brittle, and cannot brook dissent - the higher-placed and more powerful the figure, the less dissent can be tolerated. Hence, the hollowing out of militaries - all important figures MUST be loyal above all, and competence either doesn’t matter, or is a threat insofar as it increases the power of the figure outside of the oligarchy. Economics doesn’t need to enter into it at all.
Democratic regimes have safety valves for dissent - meaningful elections. Authoritarian regimes, inherently, do not have that release. They, as JFK once said, ensure peaceful change is impossible - and in doing so, close off all possibilities except violent change. All dissident forces in an authoritarian society will end up backing ‘undesirable’ methods of change, and no one in an authoritarian regime, other than the oligarchy itself, is better placed to affect said methods of change other than the military. Either an authoritarian regime must castrate the military, or it will be overthrown (effectively or outright) by the military.
Again, the democratic government.
The democratic government has a reduced need for repression, making broad participation in the military less necessary to monitor. The number of people who are ‘political undesirables’ who must be reassigned away from positions of their competency in a total war scenario is much smaller, while a totalitarian government necessarily must prevent them from holding any important positions for its own long-term survival - and the decision-making of an oligarchy prioritizes its own long-term survival above everything, including success in war.
The democratic government does not need to closely monitor its war output, unlike an authoritarian regime - democratic governments enjoy broad legitimacy when they are legitimately democratic, while authoritarian regimes always endure some amount of irrepressible dissent in the population that manifests itself in deliberate disobedience and sabotage of the government’s efforts - including war efforts. Furthermore, the looser controls that a democratic society holds over its production is a further advantage, as each government manager and overseer that is not needed to ensure compliance of production with the wishes of the state (unlike in a totalitarian regime, where government functionaries and strict orders are the primary means of communication of all behavior of production) is one who is free for other tasks for the war effort.
The democratic government does not need the same level of distrust in its military figures - an authoritarian government is more at risk of a coup in wartime than any other period, as coups in an authoritarian society are easily justified by the same reasoning that the authoritarian government itself uses. Democratic governments in wartime are prone to democratic backsliding, but a significantly reduced risk of outright coups compared to authoritarian regimes, as a military coup necessarily demands a significant change from the basic and fundamental legitimizing reasoning of a democratic society - something which discourages many would-be coup plotters. This means that when General Patton asks for 99,000 troops on the north-eastern front, the demand is more likely to be fulfilled in accordance with the democratic government’s perception of military and political necessity than of the fear of those forces being turned against them - unlike, say, Prigozhin making requests of the authoritarian government or withdrawing his troops to the border of the Motherland.
Cooperation is very powerful, and it’s why democratic governments, or at least more democratic governments, have become widespread, while more naked autocracies and oligarchies have declined. Not because of some deep, moral yearning in mankind’s soul that was only awakened in the past ten seconds of civilization’s existence, but because the rise of coherent and stable national governments (as opposed to the ad hoc nature of dynasties) favors efficient methods of government, by simple process of natural selection if nothing else.
I do, don’t worry! I appreciate a good argument.
I see the spirit of your position now, and appreciate you taking time in explaining it to me. I hope you’re right, too.