So basically, my setup has everything encrypted except /boot/efi. This means that /boot/grub is encrypted, along with my kernels.

I am now attempting to get secure boot setup, to lock some stuff, down, but I encountered this issue: https://bbs.archlinux.org/viewtopic.php?id=282076

Now I could sign the font files… but I don’t want to. Font files and grub config are located under /boot/grub, and therefore encrypted. An attacker doing something like removing my hard drive would not be able to modify them.

I don’t want to go through the effort of encrypting font files, does anyone know if there is a version of grub that doesn’t do this?

Actually, preferably, I would like a version of grub that doesn’t verify ANYTHING. Since everything but grub’s efi file is encrypted, it would be so much simpler to only do secure boot for that.

And yes, I do understand there are security benefits to being able to prevent an attacker that has gained some level of running access to do something like replacing your kernel. But I’m less concerned about that vector of attack, I would simply like to make it so that my laptops aren’t affected by evil maid attacks, without losing benefits from timeshift or whatnot.

I found the specific commit where grub enforces verification of font files: https://github.com/rhboot/grub2/commit/539662956ad787fffa662720a67c98c217d78128

But I don’t really feel interested in creating and maintaining my own fork of grub, and I am wondering if someone has already done that.

  • hottari@lemmy.ml
    1·
    1 year ago

    I understand why this is a problem, or would be on systems where much of the initial stages of the system are left unencrypted. But because literally everything but grubx64.efi is encrypted, there is no need for them to be verified. Only grub, which asks for my password for the decrypting, needs to be verified. This behavior is intended for systems that require more security, for example, to prevent unauthorized loading of drivers by a malicious attacker. But I don’t need or want that.

    Sounds like cope to me. You don’t get to tell an attacker which component they can attack when you have misconfigured your security guards.

    Oh no, if only you had a setup where you could instantly reboot into an older kernel, with one click.

    I keep the LTS kernel around for that. It’s a “one-click solution” for boot problems. And anyway, a simple chroot should allow me to fix any problems.

    Don’t see what advantage snapper rollbacks have for me when I would need to use it rarely. I don’t have a habit of intentionally breaking things. And when things break on me (I use Arch btw), they rarely introduce fatal errors.

    • moonpiedumplings@programming.devOP
      1·
      1 year ago

      Sounds like cope to me. You don’t get to tell an attacker which component they can attack when you have misconfigured your security guards.

      There is only a single thing on my system unencrypted: the grubx64.efi binary. This binary is verified via secure boot. Unless an attacker can break luks2 encryption, they cannot get to anything else.

      I keep the LTS kernel around for that

      Did you read your own post? The lts kernel was affected too. That’s why I used it as an example.

      anyway, a simple chroot should allow me to fix any problems.

      You could also just nab the older kernel from the archive or something, if your system still boots. But I don’t want to have to do that. I have better things to spend my time on then going through the pain of disabling all my security features so I can chroot into an encrypted system.

      • hottari@lemmy.ml
        1·
        1 year ago

        There is only a single thing on my system unencrypted: the grubx64.efi binary. This binary is verified via secure boot. Unless an attacker can break luks2 encryption, they cannot get to anything else.

        I don’t know enough about the subject of a secure grub to tell you how wrong you are.

        Did you read your own post? The lts kernel was affected too. That’s why I used it as an example.

        Yes I did. It was a terrible example. As all I would need to know was the last working version for TPM. Regression in LTS does not factor in this equation.

        And most importantly, it would not stop me from booting.

        You could also just nab the older kernel from the archive or something, if your system still boots. But I don’t want to have to do that. I have better things to spend my time on then going through the pain of disabling all my security features so I can chroot into an encrypted system.

        You think you are saying something smart here but I assure you, you couldn’t be more conceited. You are maintaining a patch of grub for a bug that grub has no idea it exists. And you claim not to have time to fix your installation…

        • moonpiedumplings@programming.devOP
          1·
          1 year ago

          I don’t know enough about the subject of a secure grub to tell you how wrong you are.

          If you don’t know, then why don’t you shut up, yeah? I’ve spent 3 weeks researching this, even going as far to read the source of grub. Don’t just assume you’re right without doing any research.

          You think you are saying something smart here but I assure you, you couldn’t be more conceited. You are maintaining a patch of grub for a bug that grub has no idea it exists. And you claim not to have time to fix your installation…

          I have the time now. Classes are just getting started. But I’ll be busier in the future. Due to the way that arch is setup, this is easier than signing everything, plus I get instant restores.

          And it’s not a bug. It’s intended behavior for systems like high value servers where security is valued over all else, to prevent privilege escalation by an attacker exploiting a kernel bug to load more kernel modules or taking advantage of a similar exploit. But for my desktop system, such an attack is not in my threat model.